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Abstract—Two related online problems: knapsack and truthful
bipartite matching are considered. For these two problems, the
common theme is how to ‘match’ an arriving left vertex in an
online fashion with any of the available right vertices, if at all,
so as to maximize the sum of the value of the matched edges,
subject to satisfying a sum-weight constraint on the matched left
vertices. Assuming that the left vertices arrive in an uniformly
random order (secretary model), two almost similar algorithms
are proposed for the two problems, that are 2e competitive
and 24 competitive, respectively. The proposed online bipartite
matching algorithm is also shown to be truthful: there is no
incentive for any left vertex to misreport its bid/weight. Direct
applications of these problems include job allocation with load
balancing, generalized adwords, crowdsourcing auctions, and
matching wireless users to cooperative relays in device-to-device
communication enabled cellular network.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we consider two basic online combinatorial
problems : knapsack and truthful bipartite matching, that have
wide applications in practice. We first consider the online
knapsack problem, where each item, that has two attributes
: value and weight, appears sequentially, and has to be ac-
cepted/rejected irrevocably using only causal information, to
maximize the total value of the selected items subject to the
sum of their weights being less than the specified capacity.
The knapack problem is a classical combinatorial problem,
whose online version has also received considerable attention
in the literature [1]–[3], as it captures many of the modern
resource allocation problems such as generalized adwords, job
allocation in cloud computing, load balancing, cognitive radio,
admission control and many others [4]–[8].
The second and related problem to the online knapsack
problem is the truthful budgeted bipartite matching problem
over a graph G(L ∪ R,E), where the right vertex set R
is known ahead of time, while left vertices of L arrive
sequentially. On the arrival of a left vertex ℓ, utilities of all
edges incident on it as well as its bid c(ℓ) are revealed. Any left
vertex can be matched or accepted only if the payment made
to it is larger than c(ℓ). With a total payment budget constraint
of C, the problem is to decide which unmatched vertex of R
to match with ℓ, if at all, immediately and irrevocably, so as
to maximize the sum of the utility of all the matched/accepted
edges. We assume that left vertices are strategic players, which
could potentially manipulate the reporting of their true bid, and
hence seek a truthful algorithm, i.e., no incoming vertex has
any incentive to misreport its bid to maximize its profit.
The two problems are closely related, since knapsack prob-
lem can be modelled as a bipartite matching problem, where
all edges incident on a left vertex have same utilities (value
of the item) and the capacity constraint on sum-weight is
equivalent to the payment budget constraint. Only the truthful
aspect is different.
Important applications of the truthful budgeted bipartite
matching problem are in crowdsourcing [9], [10] and device-
to-device (D2D) cellular wireless communication. The crowd-
sourcing motivation is exemplified by modern cloud platforms
such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTRK), ClickWorker
(CLKWRKR), CrowdFlower (CRDFLWR) that has been well
discussed in literature [9]–[12]. In a D2D network, the basic
idea is for idle nodes to help relay other nodes’ data to/from the
basestation or amongst themselves [13], [14]. Since relaying
costs resources, each node demands a payment for its help,
and the problem is to find an association/matching rule as to
who should help whom [15] and also the payment to be made
for helpers, subject to a total budget constraint on payment.
To extract largest payment, each node can behave strategically,
and hence there is a need for making this association/matching
truthful.
To keep both the problems non-degenerate, similar to other
prior related works on online algorithms [3], [16], we con-
sider a secretarial input model, where the order of arrival of
items/left vertices is uniformly random, but their utilities and
bids are allowed to be arbitrary. Under this model, we first
consider an offline algorithm proposed in [17] that is useful
for both problems, and then use the sample and price idea
to make the algorithms online. We also make a large market
assumption, i.e., the utility of any one edge is small compared
to the sum-utility of the optimal matching, that is commonly
observed in practice for most problems of interest, and is
widely used in auction literature [18]–[20].
To quantify the performance of any online algorithm, we use
the well established metric of competitive ratio, that measures
the ratio of the profit of the online algorithm and the optimal
offline algorithm (that has access to non-causal information).
We briefly discuss the prior work on both these problems.
The online knapsack problem has been studied widely [1]–
[3], with the best known competitive ratio of 10e reported
in [3] for a randomized algorithm under the secretarial input.
The truthful budgeted bipartite matching problem is a special
case of a reverse auction [21], where users submit bids for
accomplishing a set of tasks and if selected, expect a payment
at least as much as their reported bids. The offline version
of the truthful matching problem, where the full graph is
revealed ahead of time, has been considered in [12], where
a 3-approximate algorithm has been derived that is one-
sided truthful. When the goal is to maximize the number of
matched edges, [22] provides a 320-competitive online truthful
algorithm assuming the secretarial input model. Under large
market assumption, the best known bound for the considered
online problem is a 24β-competitive algorithm [17], where β
is the ratio of the largest to the smallest utility of any edge.
Under some additional restrictions such as utilities of all edges
incident on a right vertex are identical, a constant-competitive
algorithm has been derived in [23]. Our contributions:
• Assuming a large market assumption and secretarial
input, we propose a simple algorithm for the online
knapsack problem, that is shown to be 2e competitive.
Compared to prior work [3], enforcing the large market
assumption, which is mostly satisfied in practice espe-
cially in networking problems, we are able to significantly
improve the competitive ratio from 10e to 2e. Moreover,
our algorithm is also deterministic.
• The second main contribution of this paper is a 24-
competitive online bipartite matching algorithm that is
truthful and satisfies the payment budget constraint. The
previous best known result is a 24β-competitive algo-
rithm [17] (β is the ratio of the largest to the smallest
utility of any edge). Since our algorithm has constant
competitiveness, it is scalable and appealing for applica-
tions in large networks.
II. ONLINE KNAPSACK PROBLEM
Let the value and weight of item i ∈ I, |I| = n, be v(i)
and w(i), respectively, and the corresponding weight to value
ratio (called the buck per bang in the paper) be b(i) = w(i)v(i) .
The weights and values (and buck per bang) are arbitrary and
allowed to be selected by an adversary. The knapsack problem
is to select the set of items that maximizes the sum of their
values, subject to a constraint C on the sum of the weight of
the items in the selected set. Thus, without loss of generality,
let w(i) ≤ C, ∀ i.
We consider the online knapsack problem, and to keep it
non-degenerate in terms of competitive ratio, we assume that
the order of arrival of items is uniformly random (secretary-
model), i.e., each permutation over n arriving items is equally
likely. Let π be a uniformly random permutation over [1 : n].
Then the the kth item that arrives has value v(π−1(k)), weight
w(π−1(k)), and buck per bang b(π−1(k)). Under this model,
we also assume that given two items arriving at locations π(i)
and π(j), if b(i) > b(j), then P (w(i) > w(j)) = 12 which is
reasonable for most applications.
For a set S, we let v(S) =
∑
s∈S v(s). For any online
algorithm A (where on arrival of item i, it has to be either
accepted/rejected instantaneously and irrevocably), the com-
petitive ratio for solving the knapsack problem is defined as
µA = min
I
Eπ
{∑
s∈SA
v(s)
}
v(OPT(C))
,
where OPT(C) is the optimal offline set of selected items
and SA is the set of items selected by A, with sum weight
constraint C. The online knapsack problem is to find the best
algorithm A that maximizes the competitive ratio µA. A is
said to be α > 1 competitive if µA = 1/α.
We map the knapsack problem to a matching problem,1
where we define a bipartite graph G = (L ∪ R,E) whose
each left vertex ℓ ∈ L corresponds to item ℓ ∈ I (|L| = |I|),
and the number of right vertices |R| = |I|, and edge set
E = {e = (ℓ, r) : v(e) = v(ℓ), ∀ r ∈ R}. Thus, each
edge incident on left vertex ℓ has the same value. Finding
the max-weight matching M in G in an online manner, such
that
∑
e=(ℓ,r)∈Mw(ℓ) ≤ C is equivalent to solving the online
knapsack problem, where on arrival of each left vertex it has
to be matched or permanently left unmatched, instantaneously
and irrevocably. From hereon, we entirely focus on finding
an efficient bipartite online matching subject to capacity con-
straint C.
Assumption 1. Let vmax = maxe∈E v(e), and v(OPT(C))
be the optimal value of the matching under the capacity
constraint. We assume the typical large market assumption
[12], i.e., vmaxv(OPT(C)) = o(1), thus, no single user can influence
the outcome significantly.
Similar to buck per bang of left vertex, we define for each
edge e = (ℓ, r) a buck per bang b(e) = w(e)v(e) that represents
the weight/cost per unit utility. For any γ, let G(γ) be the
graph obtained by removing all edges e ∈ E(G) with buck
per bang b(e) > γ. Then the proposed online max-weight
algorithm ON for solving the online knapsack problem is as
given by Algorithm 1. The idea behind ON is as follows:
• Do not match any of the first t left vertices (called
the offline phase), and only use them to run the offline
THRESHOLD algorithm [17] and find the threshold γt and
the matching Mt with capacity C.
• For any right vertex r, such that e = (∗, r) ∈ Mt, set
its price(r) and cost(r) to be the buck per bang and the
weight of the left vertex matched to r in Mt, respectively.
• In the decision phase, starting with the arrival of t+ 1st
left vertex, do not consider it for selection if its buck per
bang b(e) larger than γt. Otherwise, match the newly
arrived left vertex ℓ to the available/unmatched right
vertex r with the smallest price that is larger than the
buck per bang b(ℓ) of ℓ and has weight less than the cost
of r. Thus the number of selected/matched left vertices
is at most the number of left vertices matched by the
THRESHOLD algorithm in the offline phase.
Before proving results on ON, we first consider the sub-
routine (THRESHOLD algorithm [17]) that is used to generate
an offline matching with the first t left vertices, where the
GREEDY subroutine is the usual greedy matching algorithm
for a bipartite graph. Essentially, the THRESHOLD algorithm
tries to find the largest threshold γC such that the sum-weight
of the edges that are part of the greedy matching on the
1The degree of any left or right vertex can be at most 1.
Algorithm 1 ON Algorithm
1: Input: L set of left vertices/users that arrive sequentially
in order π, R set of right vertices, Capacity C
2: %Offline Phase
3: Lt = first t left vertices of L
4: Run THRESHOLD on Gt = (Lt ∪ R,Et) to obtain γt ,
γC(Gt) and matching Mt
5: for each right vertex r ∈ R do
6: if e = (ℓ, r) ∈ Mt then
7: Set price(r) := b(ℓ), cost(r) := w(ℓ)
8: else
9: price(r) := 0 cost(r) := 0
10: end if
11: end for
12: %Decision Phase
13: MON = ∅
14: R′ = {r ∈ R : price(r) > 0}.
15: for every new left vertex ℓ ∈ L\Lt do,
16: if b(ℓ) = w(ℓ)v(ℓ) > γt then
17: %Pruning: Let ℓ be permanently unmatched
18: Break
19: else
20: Let e⋆ = (ℓ, r) be the edge with the smallest
price(r), r ∈ R′ such that b(ℓ) < price(r) and w(ℓ) <
cost(r)
21: if MON ∪ {e⋆} is a matching then
22: MON = MON ∪ {e⋆}
23: else
24: Let ℓ be permanently unmatched,
25: end if
26: end if
27: end for
edges with buck per bang less than the threshold, satisfies
the capacity constraint.
Algorithm 2 THRESHOLD
1: Input: Graph G, Capacity C
2: Output: Matching M, Threshold γC
3: A(G) = {γ :
∑
e∈M γv(e) ≤ C, M = GREEDY(G(γ))}
4: γC = max{γ : γ ∈ A(G)}
5: Accept all users in M = GREEDY(G(γC))
Remark 1. The matching M output by THRESHOLD algorithm
for graph G is a Greedy matching for graph G(γC). Moreover,
since all matched left vertices have b(e) ≤ γ, and from the
definition of THRESHOLD algorithm, γC
∑
e∈M v(e) ≤ C, we
have
∑
ℓ:e=(ℓ,r)∈Mw(ℓ) ≤ C, i.e., M satisfies the capacity
constraint.
We next list some important properties of THRESHOLD
algorithm [17], whose proofs are presented in the Appendices
for completeness sake.
Lemma 1. [17] Let M(off) be the matching output by
THRESHOLD algorithm with input graph G under capacity
constraint C. Then under Assumption 1, v(M(off)) ≥ OPT(C)3+o(1) .
Lemma 1 is valid for all graphs, but if we restrict to a special
class of graphs considered in this section, where values of all
edges incident on any left vertex are identical and the number
of right and left vertices are equal, we can get a better bound
as a corollary to Lemma 1 as follows.
Corollary 1. Let M(off) be the matching output by THRESH-
OLD algorithm with input graph G (where edge set E = {e =
(ℓ, r) : v(e) = v(ℓ)}) under capacity constraint C. Then under
Assumption 1, v(M(off)) ≥ OPT(C)1+o(1) .
Remark 2. Assumption 1 is critical in the sense that if it
is violated, then the approximation ratio of the THRESHOLD
algorithm can be arbitrarily bad which can be showed as
follows. Consider the case when there are only two items,
v(1) = 1, w(1) = 1, and v(2) = C − 1, w(2) = C, with
capacity C. The optimal solution is to just choose item 2
(assumption 1 is not satisfied since v({2})/v(OPT(C)) = 1),
while the THRESHOLD algorithm will choose item 1 and the
approximation ratio will be 1/C.
Before analyzing the ON algorithm, we first consider the
offline case, when THRESHOLD is run over the full graph
G(L∪R,E) and output threshold is γ and matching is M(off).
Recall that the edge weights of all edges incident on any left
vertex are identical and the number of left and right vertices
are equal. Hence the greedy matching M(off) output by the
THRESHOLD ’offline’ algorithm (when run on the full graph
G(L∪R,E)) contains all the left vertices that have buck per
bang less than or equal to the threshold γ. Let the set of left
vertices selected by the THRESHOLD algorithm be L⋆, i.e., set
of left vertices with buck per bang less than γ. From Corollary
1, we know that the utility of set L⋆ is almost optimal.
In the online case, we now aim to select as many left vertices
of L⋆, though without knowing γ exactly, since THRESHOLD
cannot be run on the full graph G. Alternatively, we are trying
to select as many left vertices that have buck per bang less than
γ. This is reminiscent of the k-secretary problem, where the
objective is to select the k secretaries with the largest utilities
in an online fashion.
Apart from the major challenge of finding γ, another minor
problem is that we do not know how many secretaries we want
to pick ahead of time. We overcome both these challenges via
algorithm ON, where we first estimate a γt ≥ γ by running
THRESHOLD on a subgraph Gt ⊆ G (graph consisting of the
first t left vertices of G), and then select as many left vertices
that are matched/selected by running THRESHOLD on graph
Gt. We show that algorithm ON selects any left vertex that is
part of L⋆ with probability at least 1/2e.
We next state a critical lemma for analyzing the performance
of the ON algorithm that shows that the γt computed in the
offline phase of ON is always larger than γ (Lemma 4), and
hence all vertices of G that are part of M(off) are not pruned
in Step 17 of the ON algorithm.
Lemma 2. [17] Let G = (L ∪R,E) and F ⊆ G, such that
F = (L\L′∪R,E′), and the edge set E′ is such that all edges
incident on left vertices in set L′ are removed simultaneously,
while all edges incident on L\L′ are retained as it is. Then
v(GREEDY(G)) ≥ v(GREEDY(F )).
Moreover
v(GREEDY(G(γ1))) ≥ v(GREEDY(G(γ2))) for γ1 ≥ γ2,
and
v(GREEDY(G(γ))) ≥ v(GREEDY(F (γ))).
For arbitrary subgraph F ⊆ G (where any arbitrary edges
are removed from G), v(GREEDY(G)) may or may not be
larger than v(GREEDY(F )). The importance of Lemma 2 is in
showing that THRESHOLD is solvable in polynomial time and
the threshold γC is monotonic for classes of graphs considered
in this paper. In particular, for the bipartite graphs considered
in this paper, each left vertex has a fixed weight/cost and the
buck-per-bang of edge e = (ℓ, r) is b(e) = w(ℓ)v(e) . Thus, if any
edge e = (ℓ, r) has b(e) > γ, then all edges e′ = (ℓ, ∗) for
which their value v(e′) < v(e) that are incident on the left
vertex ℓ also have b(e) > γ and are not part of graph G(γ).
We prove the two claims as follows.
Lemma 3. [17] THRESHOLD is solvable in polynomial time.
Algorithm THRESHOLD involves finding a maximum in
Step 4. In the proof, it is shown that bisection can be used
to solve this maximization. We would like to note that if
v(GREEDY(G(γ))) ≯ v(GREEDY(F (γ))), then finding this
maximum is non-trivial.
The following Lemma shows that if THRESHOLD algorithm
is run on a (special) subgraph of G, then the output threshold
γC increases, which we critically need to show that all left
vertices that are part of L⋆ are eligible for matching in the
ON algorithm.
Lemma 4. [17] Let G = (L∪R,E) and F = (L\L′∪R,E′),
where the edge set E′ is such that all edges incident on left
vertices in set L′ are removed simultaneously, while all edges
incident on L\L′ are retained as it is. Then γC(F ) ≥ γC(G).
Finally, we are ready to state the first main result of the
paper on the expected utility of the online matching MON,
output by the ON algorithm.
Theorem 1. E{v(MON)} ≥ v(OPT(C))2e(1+o(1)) .
Proof: Consider the full graph G = (L ∪ R,E) (offline)
and its subset Gt = (Lt ∪ R,Et) (offline for ON), and let γ
and γt be the output threshold when THRESHOLD is run over
G and Gt, both with capacity C, respectively. From Lemma 4,
it follows that γt ≥ γ, hence all the left vertices L⋆ matched
by the THRESHOLD algorithm with the full graph G that arrive
in the decision phase are not pruned in Step 17 with the ON
algorithm.
In the decision phase of the ON algorithm, disregard the
condition that w(ℓ) < cost(r) for selecting a left vertex for
now. Then the left vertex ℓ ∈ L⋆ that appears in the decision
phase at the ith position, i > t, is selected as long as it
is selected by the VIRTUAL Algorithm [3]. This assertion
follows since with the VIRTUAL Algorithm, a left vertex in the
decision phase is selected only if its buck per bang is lower
than the currently largest price among the right vertices in the
reference set R′, and more importantly that the current largest
price was derived from the buck per bang of a left vertex that
arrived in the offline phase. With algorithm ON, a left vertex
in the decision phase is selected as long as there is at least one
unmatched right vertex with price larger than its buck per bang.
Thus, if any left vertex is selected by VIRTUAL Algorithm then
it is definitely selected by the ON algorithm. We illustrate the
main difference between the ON and the VIRTUAL Algorithm
via an example as follows.
Algorithm 3 Virtual Algorithm
1: %Offline Phase Input: Lt, (Mt, γt) = THRESHOLD(Lt ∪
R)
2: V = {r : (ℓ, r) ∈ Mt}
3: price(r) = b(e) for e = (ℓ, r) ∈ Mt
4: Order the elements of V in increasing price(r), r ∈ V ,
the element with the largest price is r|V |
5: Initialize S = Φ
6: For every new left vertex ℓ ∈ L\Lt in the decision phase
7: if b(ℓ) < price(r|V |) then
8: if r|V | was sampled in offline phase then
9: S = S ∪ {ℓ}
10: end if
11: Update price(r|V |) = γ(ℓ)
12: Order the elements of V in increasing price(r), r ∈ V
13: else Do nothing and keep ℓ unmatched
14: end if
Example 1. Consider the input graph G, where in the
offline phase two left vertices that are matched/selected
by the THRESHOLD algorithm are S = {s1, s2} with
{b(s1), b(s2)} = {1/5, 1/6}. Let the left vertices ℓ1, ℓ2
(indexed in order of arrival) in the decision phase have
{b(ℓ1), b(ℓ2)} = {1/5.1, 1/7}, respectively. Then with
the ON algorithm, on arrival of ℓ1 with b(ℓ1) = 1/5.1
it is compared with s1 that has b(s1) = 1/5 and since
b(ℓ1) < b(s1), ℓ1 is selected. Similarly, on arrival of ℓ2
with b(ℓ2) = 1/7 it is compared with s2 (that has not been
compared before and matched) that has b(s2) = 1/6, and
ℓ2 is also selected. With the VIRTUAL algorithm, the offline
matched set {b(s1), b(s2)} = {1/5, 1/6} remains the same as
in ON. Moreover, in the decision phase, on arrival of ℓ1 with
b(ℓ) = 1/5.1 it is compared with s1 (with worst b(.) value
among the two), and since b(ℓ1) < b(s1), ℓ1 is selected. The
main difference is in the next step, where the set V = {s1, s2}
is updated to include ℓ1 and eject s1 to get the reference
set as V = {ℓ1, s2} with {b(ℓ1), b(s2)} = {1/5.1, 1/6}.
Next, when ℓ2 arrives with b(ℓ) = 1/7, even though it has
better buck per bang than both b(ℓ1) and b(s2), but since the
maximum value of b(.) among ℓ1 and s2, 1/5.1 is seen in the
decision phase and not in the offline phase; ℓ2 is not selected.
From [3], with the VIRTUAL Algorithm, a new left vertex
that appears at location i is selected if and only if at location i,
the left vertex with the largest buck per bang in the virtual set
V is sampled at or before time t. Since the permutations are
uniformly random, the probability of this event is ti−1 . Hence
the probability of selecting ℓ ∈ L⋆ when it arrives at position
i ∈ [t+ 1, n] is
P (ℓ ∈ L⋆ is selected) =
n∑
i=t+1
1
n
t
i− 1
=
t
n
n∑
i=t+1
1
i− 1
>
t
n
∫ n
t
dx
x
=
t
n
ln
(n
t
)
, (1)
where the first equality follows since the probability of ℓ
arriving at the ith location is 1n independent of i. Choos-
ing t = ne , maximizes the lower bound, and we get that
P (ℓ ∈ L⋆ is selected) = 1/e.
Hence by linearity of expectation, we get that the expected
value of the selected left vertices by ON algorithm is at least
E {v(MON)} ≥
∑
ℓ∈L⋆
1
e
v(ℓ) =
1
e
v(Moff). (2)
Now we enforce the condition that w(ℓ) < cost(r) for
selecting a left vertex. We show in Lemma 5 that selecting
left vertices only when w(ℓ) < cost(r) implies that ON
algorithm satisfies the sum-weight constraint C. Recall that
we have assumed that under the secretarial model of input,
given b(i) > b(j), P (w(i) > w(j)) = 12 . Since each left
vertex ℓ selected by ON algorithm has b(ℓ) ≤ b(j) for some
left vertex j that is part of offline matching Mt. Thus, each left
vertex that belongs to MON without enforcing w(ℓ) < cost(r),
is selected with probability 1/2 even when the constraint is
enforced, and we get from (2), that
E{v(MON)} =
1
2e
v(Moff). (3)
Finally, the result follows since v(Moff) > v(OPT)1+o(1) from
Corollary 1.
Lemma 5. Algorithm ON satisfies the capacity constraint.
Proof: Let γt = γC(Gt) for simplicity. For each r ∈ R′
(right vertices matched in the offline phase), from Remark 1
we have that for THRESHOLD algorithm,
∑
r∈R′ cost(r) ≤ C.
In the decision phase, any left vertex is accepted (is matched
to r ∈ R′) if its weight is less than the cost of r ∈ R′,
and once r ∈ R′ is matched it is not available thereafter
(at most |R′| left vertices are selected). Therefore, it directly
follows that for the set of matched left vertices in the decision
phase LD,
∑
ℓ∈LD
w(ℓ) ≤
∑
r∈R′ cost(r). Since we know
that
∑
r∈R′ cost(r) ≤ C, the claim follows.
Discussion: In this section, we proposed an online algorithm
ON for the knapsack problem with competitive ratio 2e, im-
proving upon the currently best known bound of 10e [3], under
an extra large market assumption (Assumption 1). Assumption
1 is reasonable for most networking applications and has been
considered widely in auction literature [18]–[20]. Assumption
1 is also satisfied if the value of items is generated according
to a stochastic process that is light-tailed, which is what is
generally observed in practice. In the next section, we build
upon the ON algorithm to propose a truthful algorithm for the
online bipartite budgeted matching problem.
III. TRUTHFUL BUDGETED BIPARTITE MATCHING
Motivated by crowdsourcing and D2D communication ap-
plications, in this section, we consider an online matching
problem over a bipartite graph G(L ∪R,E), where the right
vertex set R is known ahead of time, while left vertices of
L arrive sequentially in a random order. The incident edge
utilities v(e), e = (ℓ, r), r ∈ R from a vertex ℓ ∈ L to set
R are revealed only upon its arrival, as well as its bid c(ℓ),
and the problem is to decide which unmatched vertex of R to
match with ℓ, if at all, immediately and irrevocably. If vertex
ℓ is matched, a payment pℓ is made to vertex ℓ that has to
be at least as much as its reported bid c(ℓ). A total budget
constraint of C is assumed for payments to be made to the
matched left vertices. We assume that left vertices are strategic
players, which could potentially manipulate the reporting of
their true cost, and hence seek a truthful algorithm, i.e., no
incoming vertex has incentive to misreport its bid. We continue
to work under the secretarial model of input and the large
market assumption (Assumption 1).
Remark 3. As shown in [9], if bids of left vertices are used
as payments, there is incentive for left vertices to misreport
their bids, and consequently the mechanism is not truthful or
incentive compatible. Thus, the payment strategy is non-trivial.
Assumption 2. In the secretarial (uniformly random) left
vertex arrival model, we also assume that for two different
edges e1 and e2 with distinct left vertices ℓ1 and ℓ2 arriving
at locations π(1) and π(2), if v(e1) > v(e2), then P (c(ℓ1) <
c(ℓ2)) = 1/2.
To solve the online truthful budgeted matching problem we
propose the ON-TRUTH algorithm that is almost identical to
the ON algorithm in terms of when a left vertex is selected.
The first difference is in size t of the set of left vertices over
which the offline algorithm THRESHOLD is run. With ON,
t = n/e, while with ON-TRUTH, t = Binomial(n, 1/2). The
second difference in setting the reward for a right vertex that
is part of the offline matching to be equal to the value of the
matched edge, instead of the buck-per-bang as in ON. A new
feature with ON-TRUTH is the payment rule for any selected
left vertex, and the payment for left vertex ℓ of the selected
edge e⋆ is γC(G′)v(e⋆).
We first compute the expected utility of matching MON−T
produced by algorithm ON-TRUTH without enforcing the
condition c(ℓ) ≤ cost(r) for selecting a left vertex on Line
17, where the expectation is over the uniformly random left
vertex arrival sequences.Lemma 6. E{v(MON−T)} ≥ v(OPT(C))/12, when condition
c(ℓ) ≤ cost(r) is not enforced for selecting a left vertex in
ON-TRUTH.
To prove the result, we work with two intermediate algo-
rithms SIMULATE and SAMPLEANDPERMUTE, that will help
in lower bounding the utility of the matching MON−T produced
by ON-TRUTH, similar to [16]. The connection between SAM-
PLEANDPERMUTE and the proposed algorithm ON-TRUTH, is
that the output matching M3p of SAMPLEANDPERMUTE and
MON−T produced by ON-TRUTH are almost identical, except
for the difference in defining the set L′ (set of left vertices
used to generate the threshold γ′), without enforcing condition
c(ℓ) ≤ cost(r) in ON-TRUTH. But with both these definitions,
Algorithm 4 ON-TRUTH Algorithm
1: Input: L set of left vertices/users that arrive sequentially
with permutation π, R set of right vertices, Payment
Budget C
2: %Offline Phase
3: p = 12 , k ← Binomial(|L|, p)
4: Let L′ be the first k vertices of L
5: Run THRESHOLD on G′ = (L′ ∪ R,E′) to obtain γ′ ,
γC(G
′) and matching M1
6: for each right vertex r : e = (ℓ, r) ∈ M1 do
7: Set reward(r) := v(e) and cost(r) := c(ℓ)
8: end for
9: for each right vertex r : (∗, r) /∈ M1 do
10: Set reward(r) := 0 and cost(r) := 0
11: end for
12: %Decision Phase
13: MON−T = ∅
14: for every new left vertex ℓ ∈ L\L′ do,
15: %Pruning: Delete all edges e = (ℓ, r), r ∈ R s.t.
b(e) > γ′
16: Let e⋆ = (ℓ, r) be the edge with the largest value such
that v(e⋆) ≥ reward(r) AND c(ℓ) ≤ cost(r)
17: if MON−T ∪ {e⋆} is a matching then
18: MON−T = MON−T ∪ {e⋆}
19: Pay pℓ = γ′v(e⋆) to vertex ℓ
20: else
21: Let ℓ be permanently unmatched
22: end if
23: end for
Algorithm 5 SIMULATE Algorithm
1: Input: Graph G and threshold (γ)
2: Output: Matching M1s,M2s
3: Remove edges of G with b(e) > γ to get G(γ)
4: Sort edges of G(γ) in decreasing order of their value
5: M1s = Φ,M2s = Φ
6: Mark each left vertex ℓ ∈ G(γ) as unassigned
7: For each edge e = (ℓ, r) in sorted order
8: if ℓ is unassigned AND M1s ∪ e is a matching then
9: Mark ℓ as assigend
10: Flip a coin with probability p of heads
11: If heads, M1s ← M1s ∪ e
12: else M2s ← M2s ∪ e
13: end if
a left vertex is selected to be part of L′ with probability
1/2 independently. Consequently, the utilities of matchings
M3p and MON−T are identical in expectation. So to lower
bound the utility of MON−T, we find a lower bound on the
utility of M3p of SAMPLEANDPERMUTE, and focus entirely
on SAMPLEANDPERMUTE algorithm as follows.
SIMULATE is an offline matching algorithm, where each
edge in descending order of its value is either assigned to
matching M1s or pseudo matching M2s2 depending on the coin
toss for that edge. Important to notice is that for SIMULATE,
2M2s is not a matching since in M2s multiple edges can be incident on
any right vertex.
Algorithm 6 SampleAndPermute Algorithm
1: Input: Graph G = (L ∪R,E)
2: Output: Matching M2p,M3p
3: %Offline Phase
4: L′ = Φ
5: for each ℓ ∈ L do
6: With probability 12 , L
′ ← L′ ∪ ℓ
7: end for
8: (M1p, γ′)→ THRESHOLD(G(L′ ∪R,E(L′)))
9: for each r ∈ R do
10: Set reward(r) = v(e) if e = (ℓ, r) ∈ M1p
11: Set reward(r) = 0 if e = (∗, r) /∈ M1p
12: end for
13: %Decision Phase
14: M2p = Φ,M3p = Φ
15: for each ℓ ∈ L\L′ and b(e) ≤ γ′ do in random order
16: Let e = (ℓ, r) be the edge with largest value such that
v(e) ≥ reward(r)
17: Add e to M2p.
18: If M3p ∪ e is a matching M3p ← M3p ∪ e
19: end for
once a coin is tossed for an edge making the left vertex
assigned, no other coin is tossed for any edge that shares
a common left vertex with it. So it is essentially identical
to tossing a coin once for each left vertex instead of each
individual edge as done in algorithm SAMPLEANDPERMUTE.
Thus, whenever coin tosses are identical for SAMPLEANDPER-
MUTE and SIMULATE, and the γ′ computed by THRESHOLD
algorithm invoked inside SAMPLEANDPERMUTE is identical
to the input γ to SIMULATE, it is easy to see that the matching
M1s = M1p and pseudo matching M2s = M2p produced by
SIMULATE and SAMPLEANDPERMUTE [16].
Lemma 7 (Lemma 2.3 [16]). For SIMULATE algorithm, if the
input threshold γ and the coin tosses for choosing an edge (to
be part of M1s or M2s) are independent, then E{v(M2s)} =
E{v(M1s)}.
Remark 4. Lemma 6 would be directly provable following
the techniques of [16], if Lemma 7 could be applied on the
matching M1s and M2s, for the case when M1s = M1p and
pseudo matchings M2s = M2p. Problem is that M1s = M1p
and pseudo matchings M2s = M2p only when the respective
coin tosses in SIMULATE and SAMPLEANDPERMUTE, and the
γ (input to SIMULATE) and γ′ (computed by THRESHOLD al-
gorithm invoked inside SAMPLEANDPERMUTE) are identical.
Since γ′ is dependent on coin tosses of SAMPLEANDPER-
MUTE, so if γ′ in input to SIMULATE and the coin tosses are
identical to as in SAMPLEANDPERMUTE, they are dependent
on each other, and Lemma 7 is not applicable.
So the proof of Lemma 6 is more involved as presented
next.
Proof: Consider the full graph G = (L∪R,E) (offline),
and let γf be the output threshold when THRESHOLD is run
over the full graph G.
Toss 2|L| coins independently with heads probability 1/2,
and record their outcomes in two vectors t1 = [t11 . . . t1|L|]
and t2 = [t21 . . . t2|L|], where tij = 1 if the (i, j)th coin
toss is heads, and 0 otherwise. We will associate t1 with coin
tosses for the |L| left vertices while running SIMULATE with
full graph G and threshold γf .
All left vertices for which t2j = 1 (set L′ as defined in
SAMPLEANDPERMUTE), will be part of the offline phase
and the remaining left vertices with t2j = 0 will be part
of decision/online phase in algorithm SAMPLEANDPERMUTE.
Let γ′
t2
be the output threshold from THRESHOLD when
executed inside the algorithm in SAMPLEANDPERMUTE with
coin toss vector t2, which is identical to running algorithm
THRESHOLD on graph (G(L′ ∪R,E′)).
Remark 5. Note that for fixed coin tosses t2 that determines
γ′
t2
completely, the matchings M1p,M2p produced by SAM-
PLEANDPERMUTE are identical to the matchings M1s,M2s
produced by SIMULATE with input G(L∪R,E) and threshold
γ′
t2
, and coin tosses t2, respectively. Hence
E{v(M2p(G(γt)))} = E{v(M2s(G(γt)))}3 (4)
For fixed realizations of coin tosses t1 and t2, now we
compare the pseudo matchings M2s produced by algorithm
SIMULATE with input graph G = (L∪R,E), threshold γf with
coin tosses t1, and input graph G(L′ ∪ R,E′) and threshold
γt2 with coin tosses t2, respectively.
Let the set of left vertices that have at least one edge in
G(γf ) and in G(γt2 ) be L1 and L2, respectively. Recall that
G(γ) contains all edges e ∈ G that have b(e) ≤ γ. From
Lemma 2, we know that any choice of t2, γt2 ≥ γf . Hence
L1 ⊆ L2. Consider the case when the realization of coin tosses
t1 and t2 restricted to set L1 of left vertices be the same. Then
independent of the coin tosses for vertices L2\L1, we have that
for algorithm SIMULATE
v(M2s(G(γt2 ))) ≥ v(M2s(G(γf ))), (5)
since γt ≥ γf and each edge present in G(γf ) is also present
in G(γt2) and M2s is a pseudo matching and accepts multiple
edges incident on any right vertex. For pseudo matching we let
v(M2s(G(γ))) =
∑
e∈M2s(G(γ))
v(e). Thus, taking expectation
of (5), we have that
E{v(M2s(G(γt2)))} ≥ E {v(M2s(G(γf )))} . (6)
Since γf (obtained by running THRESHOLD on full graph
G) does not depend on any coin tosses t1 or t2, we have from
Lemma 7,
E{v(M2s(G(γf )))} = E{v(M1s(G(γf )))}, (7)
where the expectation is over the coin tosses t1.
Next, we lower bound the E{v(M1s(G(γf )))}. Consider
graph G and threshold γf as an input to the SIMULATE
algorithm. For a fixed realization of t1, let OPT1/2(t1) be the
optimal matching considering only left vertices j for which
coin tosses t1j = 1. Taking the expectation with respect to t1,
we have that
E{v(OPT1/2)} =
E{v(OPT)}
2
. (8)
3M(G(γ)) is the matching obtained with graph G and threshold γ.
Moreover, as pointed out earlier in Remark 1, the matching
produced by THRESHOLD with output threshold γˆ is equivalent
to finding a greedy matching with graph G(γˆ). The same
is true for matching M1s produced by SIMULATE. Thus,
considering SIMULATE algorithm with input G and threshold
γ, and all left vertices with t1j = 1 with t1, from Lemma
1, v(M1s(G(γ)) ≥
v(OPT1/2(t1))
3 . Thus, taking the expectation
with respect to t1, from (8), we get
E{v(M1s(G(γ)))} =
v(OPT(C))
6
. (9)
From Lemma 2.5 [16], we have that for the SAMPLEAND-
PERMUTE algorithm,
E{v(M3p(G(γt)))} ≥
E{v(M2p(G(γt)))}
2
, (10)
since the pruning step to obtain M3p from M2p in SAMPLE-
ANDPERMUTE algorithm only depends on the relative order in
which vertices (with coin tosses t2j = 0) arrive in the decision
phase, and not on coin tosses themselves.
Combining (6), (7), (9), (10), and (4) we get that
E{v(M3(γt))} ≥
v(OPT(C))
12
.
Since the expected utility of matching M3(γt2) of SAMPLE-
ANDPERMUTE is same as the expected utility of matching
MON-T (the output of ON-TRUTH), we have the result.
The following theorem is the second main result of the
paper.
Theorem 2. Algorithm ON-TRUTH is 24-competitive, satisfies
the payment budget constraint, payment is always larger than
the bid for each selected left vertex, i.e., pℓ ≥ c(ℓ), and is
truthful.
Proof: Disregarding the condition c(ℓ) < cost(r), an edge
e incident on a left vertex ℓ is chosen by algorithm ON-TRUTH
if its value v(e) is larger than the reward (value of an edge of
a right vertex that is part of the offline matching). Hence from
Assumption 2, if a left vertex is accepted without the condition
c(ℓ) < cost(r), then it is still accepted with probability 12 while
enforcing the condition c(ℓ) < cost(r). Combining this fact
with Lemma 6, we get the 24-competitiveness of ON-TRUTH
algorithm.
The claim that pℓ ≥ c(ℓ) for each selected left vertex ℓ,
follows from the fact that each left vertex is considered in the
decision phase only if its buck per bang b(e) = c(ℓ)v(ℓ) < γ.
Since pℓ = γv(ℓ), clearly, pℓ ≥ c(ℓ). The budget feasibility
and incentive compatibility are shown in Lemma 8 and 9,
respectively.
Lemma 8. Algorithm ON-TRUTH satisfies the payment budget
constraint.
Proof: Similar to Lemma 5, by enforcing the condi-
tion that any left vertex is selected only if c(ℓ) ≤ cost(r)
for some unmatched right vertex that is part of M1, and∑
r:e=(ℓ,r)∈M1
cost(r) ≤ C for the THRESHOLD algorithm by
Remark 1.
Next, we show the most important property of ON-TRUTH,
its truthfulness. Towards that end, we will use the Myerson’s
Theorem [21].
Theorem 3. [21] A reverse auction is truthful if and only if:
• The selection rule is monotone. If a user ℓ wins the
auction by bidding c(ℓ), it would also win the auction
by bidding an amount c(ℓ)′, where c(ℓ)′ < c(ℓ).
• Each winner is paid a critical amount. If a winning user
submits a bid greater than this critical value, it will not
get selected.
Lemma 9. ON-TRUTH is a truthful online algorithm.
Proof: We show that the two conditions of Theorem 3
are satisfied for the ON-TRUTH algorithm, similar to [17].
In the decision phase, if any left vertex reduces its bid, then
clearly its buck per bang b(e) decreases, and hence it is still
accepted if it was accepted before. Thus, monotone condition
is satisfied.
The criticality of payment is shown as follows. Note that
the payment made by ON-TRUTH to a selected left vertex ℓ
is pℓ = γ′v(e), e = (ℓ, r) ∈ MON−T, where the right vertex
index r is such that utility v(e), e = (ℓ, r) is largest among
the unmatched right vertices at the time of arrival of vertex ℓ
that have an edge to left vertex ℓ, and v(e) > reward(r).
Now, if suppose the bid c(ℓ) of left vertex ℓ is more than
pℓ = γ
′v(e), then its bang per buck c(ℓ)/v(e) > γ′. Moreover,
since v(e) > v(e′) for all edges e′ incident on unmatched right
vertices from ℓ at the arrival of left vertex ℓ, we have that
c(ℓ)/v(e′) > γ′. Thus, all edges out of left vertex ℓ incident on
currently unmatched right vertices are removed in the pruning
stage of the decision phase, and hence vertex ℓ cannot be
selected.
Discussion: In this section, we proposed a 24-competitive
online algorithm for the budgeted bipartite matching problem
that is also truthful, improving upon the best known bound of
24β-competitive [17], where β is the ratio of the maximum
and minimum utility of any edge. The proposed algorithm is
a significant/fundamental improvement over prior work, since
it eliminates any dependence on the system/input parameters,
making it scalable and suitable for large networks.
IV. SIMULATION
We consider the uplink of a single cell of cellular commu-
nication for the D2D application, where 150 cellulars users
are present with one basestation. Out of 150 nodes, the helper
set is of size n = 50, while the rest 100 nodes (set R) are
seeking help. The payment budget constraint is 100. All users
are assumed to be uniformly located in the coverage area,
and the utility between any helper and a help seeking node is
drawn uniformly from [0, 20], and the bid for each helper is
drawn uniformly from [0, 5]. Let δ be the fraction of nodes
any one helper can help, and we assume that for fixed δ,
the nodes that any helper can help are uniformly distributed
among the 100 nodes. In Fig. IV, we plot the competitive
ratio of the proposed algorithm ON-TRUTH as a function of
δ. We see that the competitive ratio of ON-TRUTH algorithm
is far better than the derived guarantee (24-competitive). An
important observation from Fig. IV is that as δ increases, the
competitive ratio increases significantly, since with larger δ,
the quality of the offline matching and the number of right
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Fig. 1. Competitive ratio of the ON-TRUTH algorithm as a function of δ.
vertices matched in the offline phase increases, allowing the
ON-TRUTH algorithm to match larger number of left vertices,
and extract larger utility.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have made significant progress in finding
better online algorithms for bipartite matching under the
capacity constraint on the ’size’ of selected left vertices. Under
the large market assumption, that is reasonable in practice, we
are able to improve the best known competitive ratio for the
knapsack problem from 10e to 2e, and from non-constant to
constant for the truthful matching problem.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: Decompose the optimal fractional matching solu-
tion OPT = {OPT+ ∪OPT−}, where OPT+ contains edges
of OPT that have b(e) > γC , and OPT− contains edges
of OPT that have b(e) ≤ γC . Similarly, let OPT(γC) be
the optimal fractional matching on subgraph G(γC) ⊆ G,
where γC is the output threshold from the THRESHOLD
algorithm with graph G. By definition of optimal matching,
v(OPT−) ≤ v(OPT(γC)). Moreover, for M, the output
matching from THRESHOLD algorithm with graph G, we
have v(M) ≥ v(OPT(γC))2 , since M is a greedy matching on
G(γ) (subgraph with all edges having b(e) ≤ γC ). Therefore,
v(M) ≥ v(OPT
−)
2 .
All edges e = (ℓ, r) ∈ OPT+, have b(e) =
c(ℓ)
v(e) > γC . Thus, v(OPT
+) =
∑
e=(ℓ,r)∈OPT+ x(ℓ)v(e) <∑
e=(ℓ,r)∈OPT+ x(ℓ)c(ℓ)
γC
, where x(ℓ) are fractional weights in the
optimal solution. Moreover, the total budget constraint of C
(∑e=(ℓ,r)∈OPT x(ℓ)c(ℓ) ≤ C) implies that v(OPT+) < CγC .
Assuming that the budget constraint is tight with the THRESH-
OLD algorithm (∑e∈M γCv(e) = C), v(M) = cγC . Therefore,
v(OPT+) < v(M). Combining this with v(M) ≥ v(OPT
−)
2 , we
have v(M) ≤ 3v(OPT) as required.
If the capacity constraint is not tight with the THRESHOLD
algorithm, then under Assumption 1 (vmax/v(OPT) = o(1)),
by the definition of THRESHOLD algorithm that finds the
largest feasible γ, the leftover capacity C −
∑
e∈M γCv(e)
is no more than γCvmax, and similar argument gives us that
v(OPT) ≤ (3 + o(1))v(M).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
Proof: Compared to the proof of Lemma 1, the only
difference is in contribution from edges with b(e) ≤ γC . Since
all edge weights incident on any left vertex are identical and
the number of right vertices is equal to left vertices, greedy
matching M is actually optimal for edges with b(e) ≤ γC .
Hence v(M) = v(OPT(γC)). Noting that v(OPT(γC)) ≥
v(OPT−), we get v(M) ≥ v(OPT−), and from which the
result follows, since v(M) ≥ v(OPT+) ( proof of Lemma 1).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof: When a left vertex is removed (by deleting all
edges incident to it as considered), the proof of claim 1 follows
by standard procedure by considering each right vertex, for
which the value of the matched edge in GREEDY(G) is at
least as much as in GREEDY(F ).
For the second and third claim, note that an edge e incident
on left vertex ℓ is removed in G(γ) compared to G, if b(e) > γ
or equivalently if v(e) < c(ℓ)γ . Recall that the cost of any edge
only depends on the index of its left vertex. Hence, if edge
e = (ℓ, r) is removed from G to obtain G(γ), then all the edges
e′ incident on ℓ with utility v(e′) < v(e) are also removed.
So essentially, edges are removed monotonically from G to
produce G(γ). So the proofs for the second and third claim
follow similarly to the first.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Proof: From the definition of Algorithm THRESHOLD
its clear that if any γ ∈ A(G), then γC ≥ γ. Hence the
key step is to show that if any γ /∈ A(G), then γC < γ
which follows from the second claim of Lemma 2, that
v(GREEDY(G(γ1))) ≥ v(GREEDY(G(γ2))) for γ1 ≥ γ2.
Therefore, if for any γ /∈ A(G), then for any γ′ > γ,
γ′ /∈ A(G). Hence we can use bisection to find the maximum.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Proof: From Lemma 2,
v(M(F (γ))) ≤ v(GREEDY(G(γ))). (11)
Let the threshold and the matching obtained by running
THRESHOLD on G with budget C be γC(G) = γ, and M(G),
respectively, where γ ≤ Cv(GREEDY(G(γ))) . Now we consider
F (γ) as the input graph to the THRESHOLD with same budget
constraint C. Since γ ≤ Cv(GREEDY(G(γ))) , from (11), clearly,
γ ≤ Cv(M(F (γ)) , and
∑
e∈M(F (γ)) γv(e) ≤ C. Therefore,
γ ∈ A(F ), which by definition of γC(F ) implies γC(F ) ≥ γ.
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